SI ES REPOST MANDEN MP CON URL DE POST ORIGINAL
REFERENCIA ID 09BUENOSAIRES641
ASUNTO ARGENTINA: AMBASSADOR’S FAREWELL CALL ON FM TAIANA
CREADO 2009-06-02
LANZADO 2010-12-09
CLASIFICACION CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGEN Embajada de Bs As (TODOS ESTOS CALBES PROVIENEN DE ESTA EMBAJADA)
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Tuesday, 02 June 2009, 14:42
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000641
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/29/2029
TAGS PREL, ECON, EAIR, MASS, SENV, AMGT, VZ, AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: AMBASSADOR’S FAREWELL CALL ON FM TAIANA
REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 0498 (B) BUENOS AIRES 0632 (C) STATE 48493
Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
¶1. (C) Summary and introduction: Argentine FM Jorge Taiana told the Ambassador, during the latter’s May 28 farewell call, that the GOA had no intention of following Venezuela’s lead on expropriations. Taiana expressed concern about the visit of a team from the FAA and the prospect (which has since receded) of a downgrade in the rating of Argentina’s civil aviation regime. The Ambassador updated Taiana on MOD efforts to find new office space for the U.S. Military Group. Taiana (protect) said he knows that Argentina, in a recent submission regarding its Antarctic claim, left out the language that was agreed with the USG and other key governments in 2004 (ref C), but claimed the current electoral climate in Argentina had made it impossible to submit such specific language due to the Malvinas/Falklands issue’s continued prominence here. The Ambassador complained to Taiana that an Argentine judicial investigation was inadvertently holding up the re-exportation of cars belonging to American diplomats. The Ambassador urged resolution of Paris Club and private bondholder debts. Ref B reports discussion of Cuba issue at the OAS General Assembly. End summary.
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez
-----------------------
¶2. (C) The Ambassador indirectly asked if the the Argentine business community’s alarm regarding the latest wave of Venezuelan expropriations (including several affecting Argentina’s Techint conglomerate) was giving the GOA pause about Chavez. Taiana stressed that no one senior in the GOA -- neither CFK, other ministers or Nestor Kirchner -- wanted to follow Chavez’s lead on expropriations. Taiana said Peron had already gone through a nationalization phase in the 1940s, and the country had learned its lesson. Argentina may favor a larger state role in the economy than does the United States, but it still values the private sector and recognizes the primacy of private property for propelling economic growth and development. The GOA does not agree with what Chavez was doing, Taiana reiterated. (Comment: These comments tracked with Interior Minister Randazzo’s public comments on the week of May 25 that Chavez’s expropriations were “pre-Peronist. End comment.)
Civair
------
¶3. (C) Taiana said he was concerned about the visit of a team from the FAA and the possibility of a downgrade in Argentina’s International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA). He noted that the transition from military to civilian control of air traffic had been wrenching, with the military trying to hold on to power. He said he hoped the FAA assessment did not blow up publicly into a divisive issue. The Ambassador noted that none of the FAA’s recommendations was difficult or unfeasible. (NOTE: An FAA team was in Argentina May 27-29, completing the IASA evaluation begun in March, 2009. While official results have yet to be released, an informal readout from the team leader indicates that Argentina will maintain its IASA Category I status. The FAA provided similar information to GoA civil aviation authorities.)
Military Group
--------------
¶4. (C) Taiana asked if the Ministry of Defense had offered the U.S. Military Group alternate office space (per ref A discussion). The Ambassador acknowledged the MOD had made an offer, and that one Military Group component located at MOD headquarters had moved out of that building to the Embassy. The Ambassador explained that two other Military Group components currently located at Air Force and Navy facilities were hoping for a temporary reprieve pending a fuller discussion of updating the 1964 agreement at joint U.S.-Argentine talks in October. Taiana asked to be kept informed of developments.
Antarctic
---------
¶5. (C) Taiana (protect) said he knows that Argentina, in the data it submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding its Antarctic claim, left out the specific language that was agreed with the USG and other key governments in 2004 (ref C). He claimed that the current electoral climate in Argentina had made it impossible to submit such language with the GOA data. Doing so would have subjected the GOA to a storm of criticism for its “surrender” of Argentine claims, and resulted in his removal from office. “But if you read our submission carefully, you’ll see our language respects all Antarctic Treaty provisions,” he said, quickly adding that the prime issue for Argentina, of course, was not Antarctica, but protecting its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.
POVs
----
¶6. (C) The Ambassador explained to Taiana that an Argentine judge investigating abuse by others of diplomatic importation of vehicles had seized documents, effectively holding up the export of privately owned vehicles (POVs) belonging to American diplomats who had served in Argentina and are now posted elsewhere. The Ambassador said Washington was very concerned and looking into reciprocity measures. Taiana said he was not aware of this latest development and would look into it. (The Ambassador subsequently signed a letter to the investigating judge, to be transmitted through the MFA, which explains our serious concerns and seeks positive action.)
Paris Club
----------
¶7. (C) The Ambassador told Taiana that he had advised President Kirchner the night before (ref B) that resolution of Paris Club and private bondholder debts is clearly in Argentina’s long-term interest. Taiana agreed the GOA needed to find a way to resolve the matter, and the Ambassador noted that Planning Minister De Vido and others in the GOA seemed to be moving toward that position as well.
WAYNE
REFERENCIA ID 10BUENOSAIRES71
ASUNTO Argentina: Saber Rattling over Oil Exploration in the
CREADO 2010-02-04
LANZADO 2010-12-01
CLASIFICACION Confidencial
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000071
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED AMEMBASSY LONDON AS ADDITIONAL
ADDRESSEE.
SIPDIS
DEPT OF ENERGY FOR MANOLIS PRIONIOTAKIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/04
TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL PGOV ENRG AR
SUBJECT: Argentina: Saber Rattling over Oil Exploration in the
Falklands
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
¶1. (C) This is the first in a series of cables which will address
the Argentine reaction to hydrocarbons-related activities in the
Falklands/Malvinas islands.
¶2. (C) The GoA is reportedly hardening its policy on the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands in response to accelerating oil
exploration efforts under British authority that lack Argentine
participation or consent. According to local press reports, the
Foreign Ministry has created a plan to press Argentina's historic
claim to the islands which involves expressing displeasure to the
UK, to any companies involved, and to the governments of the
companies' home countries. This could involve the USG, since an
American supplier is sending a drilling rig to the islands. These
steps follow a 2007 resolution which threatens to cut off the
Argentine operations of any oil company that operates in the
Falklands without GoA permission. British diplomats in Argentina
are not sure how far the GoA will take these threats, and do not
rule out an "irrational" response. At present, no U.S. energy
company operating in Argentina appears to be considering activity
in the Falklands. End Summary.
Keep Your Oil Equipment Away from Our Islands
¶3. (SBU) Argentine press reports on January 27 state that the
Argentine Foreign Ministry (MFA) has developed a plan to resist oil
exploration in the Falklands/Malvinas islands located to the east
of southern Argentina, a territory claimed by the Argentines and
the British, but controlled by the British. British firm Desire
Petroleum is reportedly moving a drilling rig to the area to drill
exploratory wells. The GoA plans to assert that "any hydrocarbons
operation in the Malvinas area linked to the UK is 'illegal'
because, by authorizing it, the UK government is assuming
competency in areas of the continental shelf which are subject to
Argentine jurisdiction and sovereignty." The GoA has reportedly
planned three courses of action: a formal protest to the UK;
sending "notes of discouragement" to each company involved in such
activities, advising them that their actions are "illegal" and they
could therefore face legal sanctions; and, in the case where
companies are not British, sending protest notes to the
corresponding government(s) signaling GoA concern over the
"illegal" activities and noting possible sanctions. The USG could
receive a note under the third category because the U.S. firm
Diamond Drilling owns a drilling rig en route to the islands (and
expected to be in place by mid-February).
¶4. (SBU) The above GoA policy would be consistent with Energy
Secretariat Resolution 407 issued in 2007, which threatens to
terminate the Argentine activities (including the cancellation of
all energy concessions) of any company that operates in the
Falklands area without express GoA permission. Energy analyst
Daniel Gerold sees little chance of GoA sanctions against companies
while the process remains in the exploration stage. However, in
the event of a significant hydrocarbons discovery (either petroleum
or natural gas, which he believes is more likely), Gerold foresees
the GoA making it "a major issue," as more companies become
involved in the extraction process -- and as the GoA perceives it
is missing out on a significant revenue stream.
What Next? Brits Concerned
¶5. (C) Argentina launched the first diplomatic shot across the
British bow on February 2; British diplomats in Argentina confirmed
to EconOff that the GoA delivered a formal protest to their ChargC)
that afternoon. UK political Officers Lynda St Cooke and Oliver
Moss (the latter a former Shell Oil employee) previously told
EconOff January 28 that, while such a protest was expected and
routine (they receive numerous Falklands-related communications
from the GoA each year), they were still concerned over where GoA
actions might lead. Their concern is over the shape of future
sanctions on companies as well as threats and protests against
energy companies operating in the Falklands by NGOs, including
environmental activists.
¶6. (C) On possible sanctions, St Cooke believes that the GoA will
seek to "make an example" of a company if possible, and she
wondered what would happen if the first company to cross the "line
in the sand" were one with significant activities in Argentina.
She cited Schlumberger as an example of a company which could
provide services for oil extraction in the Falklands, given its
extensive global operations, including within Argentina. She noted
that stopping its Argentine operations would be very detrimental to
Argentine hydrocarbons production. While pursuing such an action
would be "irrational" for the GoA, she said, "We can't rule it
out." She added that this is a very one-sided issue in Argentina.
Since there are virtually no advocates for relinquishing
Argentina's claim to the islands, which is taught as sacred writ to
Argentine children beginning in elementary school, there could be
significant political pressure on the GoA to take action in case of
an oil discovery. Gerold agreed and suggested that, following a
significant hydrocarbon find, the GoA would quickly seek to begin
operations in its (undisputed) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as
close as possible to the location of the find.
¶7. (SBU) U.S. companies currently operating in Argentina have not
indicated an interest to participate in current exploration
activities near the Falklands; Randy Smith, ExxonMobil's Public and
Government Affairs Manager, told Econoff January 29 that his
company is not interested..
Comment
¶8. (C) Although the budget-strapped Argentine military is
ill-prepared for any course of action involving projection of
power, the GoA would likely feel compelled by a significant
hydrocarbon find to press Argentina's historic claims by any other
possible means. A strategy of tough talk, complaints in
international fora, and protest letters is likely, with economic
sanctions against participating companies possible, even if they
might damage Argentina's own hydrocarbons output.
MARTINEZ
REFERENCIA ID 10BUENOSAIRES95
ASUNTO Falklands/Malvinas: GoA Requires Permission for Ships to
CREADO 2010-02-17
LANZADO 2010-12-01
CLASIFICACION CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
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SIPDIS
NOFORN
OES FOR EVAN BLOOM AND HAROLD TAYLOR
DEPT OF ENERGY FOR MANOLIS PRIONIOTAKIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/17
TAGS: ECON PHSA PBTS EFIN PREL ENRG AR
SUBJECT: Falklands/Malvinas: GoA Requires Permission for Ships to
Travel to the Islands
REF: Buenos Aires 0118; Buenos Aires 0071
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
¶1. (C) The GoA issued a decree on February 16 requiring ships to
obtain GoA permission before sailing from Argentina or through
Argentine waters to reach the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Argentine
President Fernandez de Kirchner sought to justify the decree based
on UN resolutions. The decree is intended to discourage oil
exploration in territorial waters of the islands. British
diplomats in Argentina are seeking to calm the waters, but note
that Argentina has sent warning letters to companies currently
involved in such exploration. They think that there is a real
possibility that the GoA might place sanctions against these
companies, even if Argentine economic interests might be harmed in
the process. While it is unclear to what extent U.S. companies may
be affected, one target may be U.S. tour operators for Southern
Cone and Antarctica cruises that include a stop at the islands.
The British strategy is to let CFK score political points now and
wait for the issue to fade away as the public debate shifts to more
pressing domestic issues. End Summary.
Argentina Requires Ships to Request Permission to Travel to
Falklands/Malvinas
¶2. (SBU) On February 16, Cabinet Chief Anibal Fernandez announced
that President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) had that day
signed a new decree (Executive Order equivalent) requiring ships to
obtain GoA permission to sail from Argentina or through Argentine
waters to the Falklands/Malvinas and other South Atlantic islands
claimed by Argentina, or before loading cargo destined for them.
According to a GoA press release, it "establishes the requirement
for (GoA) permission to navigate between the Argentine continental
territory and the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich
Islands." Anibal Fernandez will head a commission (which will
include representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
Planning, Industry and Tourism, Economy and Justice) to oversee
implementation of the decree.
¶3. (SBU) At a public event later in the day, CFK explained that
"all ships that are headed to Puerto Argentino (i.e., Port Stanley)
must request authorization from Argentina, whatever their reason
for going." She justified this new requirement, arguing that
"there are numerous UN resolutions which request and require both
countries (i.e., Argentina and the U.K.) to renew talks to reach an
agreement on sovereignty (of the islands), and resolutions which
say that neither party can take unilateral actions." She added
that "these resolutions have been systematically ignored by the
United Kingdom, which refuses to discuss the matter," and that "the
U.K. refuses to sit at the table to discuss it as the UN orders."
She stated that she would raise the issue at the Rio Group summit
meeting to be held next week in Playa del Carmen, MC)xico.
The Reason: To Raise the Cost of Doing Business in the Islands
¶4. (SBU) Numerous press reports cited anonymous government sources
with more detailed justifications and explanations of intent.
Leading daily Clarin's source stated that "The ships that go (to
the Falklands to support oil drilling) should know that they won't
get any assistance in Argentine ports." Pro-government daily
Pagina 12's source in the MFA went further, claiming that the goal
was "to make the exploration process more expensive" and thus
discourage firms from operating there. Foreign Minister Taiana, in
a closed-door session with CFK-aligned congressmen, reportedly
repeated that last argument, while also expressing the hope that
companies would choose instead to conduct similar activities in
nearby (undisputed) Argentine waters. Another MFA source told
pro-government Pagina 12 that "last Friday, the Financial Times
reported that stock prices (of Desire Petroleum, the British
company leading the exploration efforts) were falling. That is
what our sanctions aim for, always through peaceful and legal
means, so that the risk factor that every petroleum company
(operating in the Islands) faces is increasingly higher."
¶5. (C) While the decree has yet to be published in its entirety,
the GoA may have already begun to enforce it. A British-flagged
ship, the "Thor Leader," was detained in a port north of Buenos
Aires on February 11 (it arrived at the port February 4) based on
allegations that it had delivered equipment related to the oil
exploration activity to Port Stanley prior to stopping in
Argentina. (Initial reports quoted GoA sources accusing Argentine
oil tubing manufacturer Techint of shipping its goods to the
Islands on board the Thor Leader. The company quickly denied those
claims, stating that the goods to be loaded on the ship were
destined for various customers in the Mediterranean. The
accusations against Techint have not been repeated in the past few
days, but the ship remains detained.) Local press cited the
Financial Times as the source for the information that the ship was
owned by Desire Petroleum, and attributed the drop in Desire's
stock price to the detention. However, other press reports state
that the justification for the detention was a resolution issued in
2007 (see Ref B) which threatens to shut down the Argentine
operations of any oil company that operates in the Falklands
without GoA permission.
UK Expects Continued GoA Moves to Discourage Oil & Gas Exploration
Off Falklands
¶6. (C) British diplomats in Argentina are concerned about how far
the GoA will take this matter, and are therefore seeking to
downplay the situation as much as possible. British Ambassador
Shan Morgan told DCM February 16 that the British strategy is to be
quiet and patient in the hope that the situation blows over, but
adding that London was "jumpy" over the issue. A British Embassy
source quoted by multiple dailies has followed that tack, stating
that "Argentina applies its own laws in its own territory,"
suggesting that this regulation was strictly a domestic Argentine
issue. (Several newspapers said that the quote was in response to
a question about the British-flagged Thor Leader, suggesting that
the UK is not making the detention a bilateral issue.) However,
the source is quoted as adding that "The U.K. has no doubt over its
sovereignty in the Falklands and its maritime waters, and is
convinced that the petroleum exploration is a completely legitimate
activity." Morgan noted her belief that the Kirchners were fanning
the flames in an effort to score political points domestically, a
point underscored in the Argentine press as well.
¶7. (C) British DCM Simon Thomas told EconCouns on February 11 that
the GoA had, as widely reported in the press, formally delivered to
him (as ChargC) d'Affaires) on February 2 a protest over
hydrocarbons exploration activity in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands
territorial waters that was expected to begin in mid-to-late
February. He downplayed the protest, calling it similar to many
their mission has received previously. Thomas was surprised to
learn that the USG had not yet received any similar protest,
despite the fact that the drilling rig contracted by Desire
Petroleum to do the drilling in the Falklands/Malvinas is owned and
operated by a major U.S. drilling firm, Diamond Offshore Drilling.
(British Ambassador Morgan also raised this point with DCM, saying
she has been told by London that U.S. companies had been warned by
the GoA to not participate in the project. She asked us to confirm
that the USG is not/not aware of such approaches, either to U.S.
companies or to the USG itself.)
¶8. (C) British diplomats also told EconCouns that several companies
involved in the planned exploration had received warning letters
from the GoA threatening to cancel (or prevent) their operations in
Argentina if they participate in the Falklands/Malvinas exploration
without GoA permission. In addition to Desire Petroleum, these
include Danish shipping giant Maersk, which is towing the rig to
the planned drilling site. The British believe that the intent of
the letters is to pressure companies into dropping all
Falklands-related activity; they did not rule out GoA sanctions
against these companies for continuing Falkland-related activities,
even if such action would also damage the Argentine economy.
Maersk, in particular, handles approximately 20% of Argentina's
foreign shipping, including an estimated 50% of Argentina's soy
exports, the country's top export commodity and a critically
important source of export tax revenues for the GoA.
¶9. (SBU) There have also been press reports claiming that
British-owned Barclay's Bank, the lead bank working on behalf of
the GoA on the proposed debt restructuring agreement to resolve the
problem of the "holdouts" from the earlier 2005 debt swap (Ref A),
is the single largest shareholder in Desire, with about 4.5% of the
shares. Barclay's is also said to own an interest in Minera
Alumbrera, a large copper and gold mining firm, which was
Argentina's 10th-largest exporter in 2009. Post has not yet been
able to verify either claim. In light of Barclay's ownership
position in Desire, a former Argentine congressman has filed a
lawsuit seeking to force the GoA to end Barclay's participation in
the debt restructuring. Australian company BHP Billiton was also
identified in the press as a firm with interests in both the
Falklands/Malvinas exploration and mining in Argentina.
Comment
¶10. (C) While the GoA seeks to prevent companies from participating
in oil exploration activity in the waters off of the
Falklands/Malvinas, it is not clear how much it is willing to risk
real harm to the Argentine economy as it exploits a nationalistic
issue for political gain. For now, the GoA is being scrupulous to
couch its actions in terms of adherence to UN resolutions and
international law. In the absence of an (unlikely)
British-Argentine accord on the Islands, the GoA will, in all
probability, continue to ratchet up economic pressure on Falkland
Islands residents, for whom tourism is an important cash generator.
An aggressive position on the issue unites Argentines behind their
unpopular government, and there is still a long way to go before
the steps contemplated by the GoA cause any real damage to the
Argentine economy. Current ship traffic between Argentina and the
Falklands (as well as the other islands) is limited, and the impact
of the decree on U.S. and other companies will likely also be
limited for now. However, this could change if the GoA ups the
ante and imposes significant sanctions on companies such as tour
cruise ship operators with current activities in both the Falklands
and Argentina, harming both the companies and the Argentine
economy.
MARTINEZ
REFERENCIA ID 10BUENOSAIRES111
ASUNTO Argentina: Finance Secretary Says Debt Swap Moving Ahead
CREADO 2010-02-25
LANZADO 2010-12-01
CLASIFICACION Confidencial
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SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO WLINDQUIST
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV PGOV PREL AR
SUBJECT: Argentina: Finance Secretary Says Debt Swap Moving Ahead
Despite More Negative Market Environment
REF: 10 BUENOS AIRES 118
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
-------------
¶1. (C) Argentine Finance Secretary Hernan Lorenzino expects the
GoA's proposed debt swap agreement to be fully approved by
international regulatory authorities and ready for launch by
mid-March. Noting the recent negative market environment, he said
that the exchange might have to go forward without the new money
component that was earlier thought to be a key part of the proposal
- the USD 1 billion that was to be raised from institutional
investors as part of the deal. Lorenzino dismissed the attempt by
the political opposition to tie Barclays, the lead bank working on
the debt swap, to the British oil rig exploring for oil off the
coast of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. He said Barclays was not
associated with the rig's owner and that its position working on
the holdout proposal is secure. Regarding the Paris Club debt,
Lorenzino said that the GoA would focus its attention on the issue
after the holdout debt restructuring is completed; separately,
however, he is telling at least one European Embassy that the GoA
is unwilling to submit to an IMF Article IV consultation. He also
discussed the imminent transfer of ARP 24 billion in 2009 Central
Bank (BCRA) profits to the Treasury, calling it "business as
usual." Finally, with regard to the Azurix ICSID negotiations,
Lorenzino said that the case was moving forward and that new
Treasury Attorney Da Rocha would be meeting with the Chief of
Cabinet or President in the next few days to discuss it. End
Summary.
SEC Still Asking Questions
------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Secretary of Finance Hernan Lorenzino told EconCouns on
February 22 that the GoA is waiting for U.S. Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) approval to be able to move ahead with the
proposed debt restructuring. He explained that the disruption
caused by the snow storms in the U.S. had somewhat delayed the
SEC's review process. The GoA expects to receive a new round of
SEC questions and requests for clarifications imminently.
Lorenzino said that he will not be able to estimate with any
confidence when the holdout transaction would be ready to launch
until he sees the number and complexity of these questions.
Following authorization by the SEC, the regulatory agencies of
Luxembourg, Italy and Japan will also examine the proposal. He
noted that Luxembourg has already begun reviewing the documentation
and sent several questions which the GoA expected to answer within
the next few days. The Italian regulatory agency (Consob) has also
begun an informal review of the filing. (The Italian Ambassador to
Argentine Guido La Tella told the Ambassador February 18 that he
had also met recently with Lorenzino and was given the same upbeat
presentation on the deal's prospects.) Despite continuing
uncertainty about the status of the SEC review, Lorenzino expressed
the hope that all of the international regulatory agencies involved
would complete their review processes within the next two to three
weeks, and that the GoA would be able to launch the swap in
mid-March.
New Money Component May Be Dropped
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶3. (C) Lorenzino acknowledged that while the present market
environment is becoming somewhat less positive, this does not
overly concern him. The GoA's top priority is to secure all the
necessary regulatory approvals to get the transaction ready for a
global launch. However, he did indicate, for the first time, that
the more negative market environment might require the exchange to
go forward as a stand-alone transaction, without a new money
component. (Conventional wisdom up to now has been that in order
to support the proposals, the Kirchners had demanded that at least
USD 1 billion in new money be raised from institutional investors
as an integral part of the debt swap.)
Barclays Position as Lead Bank Secure
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶4. (C) EconCouns asked whether the position of Barclays Bank as
the lead bank working for the GoA in the development of the holdout
proposal was endangered by opposition accusations that the bank
held a significant position in the British-owned company Desire
Petroleum, which is leading the controversial effort to explore
for oil and natural gas in the waters off of the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands. Lorenzino responded that Barclays position was secure.
He said that the company does not own any part of Desire Petroleum.
Rather, Barclays owns a fund that manages third-party funds which
are invested in that company. He emphasized that the Barclay's
business unit hired to work on the debt exchange has no connection
whatsoever to anything related to the Falklands/Malvinas and would
continue in its present role with regard to the holdout proposal.
Paris Club After Holdouts
---------------------------------
¶5. (C) Lorenzino said that while full attention is now focused on
the debt exchange, the GoA has the will to move forward to solve
the problem of the debt owed to the Paris Club creditors. He
explained that his people have been working on a strategic plan --
which has been presented to the Minister of Economy -- to make
progress on this issue after the completion of the debt
restructuring. He added that discussions have progressed to the
point where the government has met with various financial experts
who may potentially advise it regarding how to proceed with the
issue. (Italian Ambassador La Tella told the Ambassador that
Lorenzino described the GoA's Paris Club game-plan in greater
detail in a recent conversation, and that it is, to put it mildly,
unorthodox. In lieu of an IMF Article IV consultation, the GoA
will propose that the Paris Club accept a "peer review" of
Argentina's economy in the G20, in which Argentina is a member, or
in the OECD, in which it is not.)
2009 BCRA Profits to Treasury
-----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Lorenzino confirmed press articles which said that about
ARP 24 billion in 2009 BCRA profits would be transferred to the
Treasury. He said that this has been standard practice for the
last couple of years. He compared it to a dividend payout received
by stockholders in private companies, explaining that the profit on
the BCRA's assets came mainly from the peso devaluation and the
interest on bonds in the BCRA's portfolio. The transfer will take
place after the BCRA's Board of Directors approves the transaction.
Azurix ICSID Case
-------------------------
¶7. (C) Lorenzino explained that the Treasury Attorney's office
(Procuracion General del Tesoro) has the lead on the Azurix ICSID
case negotiations and that the Ministry of Economy's role is
secondary. He mentioned that he recently participated in two
meetings related to Azurix with the new Treasury Attorney Joaquin
Da Rocha, in one of which Economy Minister Boudou participated. In
those meetings, they discussed the general budgetary impact of
ICISD cases, including Azurix, CMS, and two similar cases which had
been decided in favor of the companies involved and awards were
granted. Regarding the Azurix case specifically, they discussed
how to deal with the complication of the involvement of the
Province of Buenos Aires in the case and how that would affect the
flow of money from the Treasury to the company. Despite that,
Lorenzino said that he was not aware of any problems that would
delay an agreement, saying that the case is moving forward, and
that Da Rocha will meet in the next few days with the Chief of
Cabinet and/or the President on the issue.
Comment
--------------
¶8. (C) Lorenzino still seems to have the full support of the
government to carry the debt restructuring through to a conclusion.
In fact, the government seems so intent on pushing the process
forward that it appears to be displaying unprecedented flexibility
in the terms it is willing to accept, i.e. the potential dropping
of the new money component. However, the one thing that could
still derail the agreement is the possibility that Minister of
Economy Boudou might be fired. Over the last few days, there have
been press reports to the effect that Boudou is on his way out due
to the problems caused to the government by his handling of the
BCRA leadership imbroglio and the controversial Bicentennial Fund.
Embassy sources discount these rumors at this point, and say that
he is likely to stay on at least until the debt swap is completed.
(And Boudou got a new public vote of confidence from Cabinet Chief
Fernandez on February 24.) Given that he has been the champion
within the government of a solution to the holdout problem, his
continued presence is crucial. If he goes now, it is unlikely that
the restructuring agreement will be completed anytime soon.
MARTINEZ
REFERENCIA ID 09BUENOSAIRES1026
ASUNTO ARGENTINA: THERE'S LIFE AFTER THE CASA ROSADA FOR
CREADO 2009-09-15
LANZADO 2010-12-01
CLASIFICACION Confidencial
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #1026/01 2580006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 150006Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4337
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001026
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2029
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL ELAB AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: THERE'S LIFE AFTER THE CASA ROSADA FOR
CFK'S FORMER CABINET CHIEF
REF: BUENOS AIRES 0802
Classified By: CDA Tom Kelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Eight weeks after leaving Argentine President
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's (CFK) administration, former
Cabinet Chief Sergio Massa told Polcouns that he parted on
good terms with CFK and "not so good terms" with CFK's
husband and power behind the throne, former president Nestor
Kirchner (NK). Massa said that CFK deferred to her husband
on all matters, and that in practice she only took orders,
showing no inclination to overrule her husband's policy
decisions or countermand his orders to government ministers
and their staffs. He said he expected NK to run for
president in 2011. Massa conveyed his own intention to run
for governor in 2011 and indicated he was already building a
team to help him run the province. End summary.
Back to Running Tigre
---------------------
¶2. (C) Argentine former Cabinet Chief Sergio Massa looked
tanned and well-rested when he met with Polcouns September 4,
a little over a month after returning to Tigre, the
medium-sized city in suburban Buenos Aires where he was
elected mayor in 2007 but took a leave of absence to work one
year for President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK).
Massa served as Cabinet Chief from July 24, 2008, through
July 8, 2009, and returned to his mayor's office in Tigre two
weeks later. Although the media had reported that Massa took
his family skiing at the southern resort of Bariloche, Massa
grinned when Polcouns asked him about the slopes and
confessed that he had actually taken his family to a beach
resort in northeastern Brazil. He was clearly pleased that
he had pulled a fast one on the media.
Greatly Relieved
----------------
¶3. (C) Massa stressed that he did not miss his highly visible
Casa Rosada position one bit. The polls, he said, indicated
he had left the Kirchner administration with his reputation
and popularity intact. Tensions between Massa and former
President Nestor Kirchner were rumored to be high, and Massa
confirmed that to us in private. He claimed he parted on
good terms with CFK and "not so good terms" with CFK's
husband and power behind the throne, former president Nestor
Kirchner (NK). Massa said that CFK deferred to her husband
on all matters, and that in practice she had become nothing
more than a subaltern who took orders and had no ability or
inclination to overrule her husband's policy decisions or
countermand his orders to government ministers and their
staffs. He also said that his replacement as Cabinet Chief,
Anibal Fernandez, 52, seemed to be making more enemies than
allies, and that Interior Minister Florencio Randazzo, 45,
who a year earlier shared the limelight with Massa as one of
CFK's most visible spokesmen, was a spent force in the
administration.
Kirchner Gearing Up for 2011
----------------------------
¶4. (C) Massa described NK as a master tactician who enjoyed a
good fight and was ultimately seized with acquiring and
asserting power for its own sake but did not have a vision
nor the coalition-building skills needed to carry out an
agenda. Massa said he believed NK was intent on running for
president in 2011, and that Daniel Scioli, 52, would run for
re-election as governor of the province of Buenos Aires on
the Kirchner ticket. Asked about rumors that NK and Scioli
might switch -- i.e., Scioli for president, and NK for
governor -- Massa said that might be a fallback plan. He
said Scioli was stuck between a rock and a hard place,
expressing some pity for Scioli's inability to extricate
himself from Kirchner's grasp, particularly as the province
is headed toward a severe fiscal crunch that will require a
bailout from the national government.
Massa's Plans for 2011
----------------------
¶5. (C) Massa was emphatic that he would not take the
congressional seat he won in the June 28 elections,
preferring instead to establish a strong record as mayor of
Tigre as a launching pad for his own gubernatorial bid in
¶2011. He spoke at length about the need to build a capable
team that he could take with him to govern the province. He
noted that CFK's new minister of economy, Amado Boudou,
seemed to be doomed for disaster because he did not have even
a small team of trusted advisers to help him develop policy
and run that portfolio.
¶6. (C) In that connection, Massa said he had hired Santiago
Montoya, the well-regarded former head of the provincial
revenue service (ARBA) who lost his job when he incurred
Kirchner's wrath by refusing to run as a candidate on the
Kirchner slate in the June 28 congressional midterm
elections. Massa also made a point of picking up his cell
phone and calling Emilio Monzo, the provincial agriculture
secretary whom Scioli had fired the week before, also at
Kirchner's behest. Massa's end of the phone conversation
made it clear he and Monzo were on good terms, and at the end
of the conversation, Massa said he was looking to find a
place for Monzo in his city administration.
Labor Problems in Tigre
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Polcouns asked Massa about intractable labor problems
at a food processing plant in Tigre owned by Kraft. Massa
said three times that he believed the company had been in the
right when it dismissed 155 workers for failing to show up to
work in July and then taking plant managers hostage in July.
He implied that the labor leaders at the plant were
extortionist and unreasonable. He made clear that he did not
see a useful role for himself in resolving the standoff, and
he was at a loss for predicting how it might end.
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) As noted reftel, Massa, 37, is smart, charismatic, and
well-liked, with an open, inclusive style that did not fit
well with the paranoid, combative Kirchners. He is generally
pro-American and, unlike others in the GOA, did not resort to
any cheap shots against the United States. Like his
predecessor, Alberto Fernandez, he emerged relatively
unscathed from his service in the Kirchner administration.
He is focused now on positioning himself for the governor's
race in 2011. In the interim, he clearly enjoys his job as
mayor and is highly popular in Tigre. Ambitious and young,
he already has an impressive record of public service (five
years as head of ANSES, the Argentine social security
administration; a year as mayor of Tigre; and a year as
Cabinet Chief). Most likely, he sees himself as a long-term
presidential contender, and we would put him in the same
generational league as other promising presidential prospects
such as Salta governor Manuel Urtubey, 40, and Chaco governor
Jorge Capitanich, 44.
KELLY
REFERENCIA ID 09BUENOSAIRES1222
ASUNTO ARGENTINA: AMBASSADOR MEETS BUENOS AIRES MAYOR
CREADO 2009-11-12
LANZADO 2010-12-01
CLASIFICACION Confidencial
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #1222/01 3162059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 122059Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4623
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001222
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC AMGT AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: AMBASSADOR MEETS BUENOS AIRES MAYOR
MACRI
Classified By: Ambassador Martinez for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Buenos Aires city mayor Mauricio Macri let
slip to the Ambassador that he intends to run for president
in 2011. He criticized the Kirchners for the failure of
their economic model, for the country's growing crime
problems, and for alienating the United States. He also
reiterated past criticisms that the USG was "too soft" on the
Kirchners. The Ambassador said Washington remained fully
committed to deepening and strengthening relations with
Argentina. Macri also reiterated an earlier invitation for
the United States government to build a new site in prime
real estate in downtown Buenos Aires. End Summary.
¶2. (U) Mayor Macri received the Ambassador for an
introductory call at City Hall on November 9. He was
accompanied by his Secretary General Marcos Pena,
international relations advisor Diego Guelar (former
ambassador to the United States), and city international
relations department chief Fulvio Pompeo. The Ambassador was
accompanied by DCM and polcouns (notetaker).
Macri's Take on the Kirchners
-----------------------------
¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked about relations between the city,
the province and the federal government, particularly in
coordinating police coverage and public security. Macri
bluntly said, "There are no relations with the Kirchner
administration at all." He said he would be meeting with
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner later that day, but
that it was only the second time in almost two years that
they have met. He said the GOA had not been receptive to
city overtures to discuss jurisdiction responsibilities to be
divided between the new metropolitan police force and the
PFA. Indeed, Macri said he suspected the GOA was
deliberately fostering havoc in the streets in order to
sabotage his new metropolitan police force from the outset.
¶4. (C) The Ambassador said she had noticed in the press that
a judge had dismissed charges against (Kirchner-allied
"piquetero" social activist) Luis D'Elia for seizing a police
station despite the strong evidence against him, including
videotape of D'Elia. Macri said he considered the court
ruling a prime example of judicial susceptibility to
intimidation, but he also said he believed the decision would
be appealed.
¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that Macri, like many other
Argentines she had spoken with, had used the word "fear" in
describing the current political climate. Macri said the
Kirchners often succeeded by bullying their opponents and
critics, but now that 80% of the Argentine public reject the
Kirchners, he thought the media were pushing back against the
Kirchners where political and business leaders had not. He
reprised an earlier conversation with then-WHA A/S Shannon
regarding the need to set limits on the Kirchners'
misbehavior and the USG's supposed "softness" on the
Kirchners. He argued that the USG's "silence" on the abusive
mistreatment it suffered at the hands of the Kirchners (such
as at the 2005 Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas) had
encouraged more of the same.
¶6. (C) Macri also ridiculed the Kirchners for touting an
economic "model" that had left 30% of Argentines in poverty.
"What kind of model is that?" he asked.
¶7. (C) Macri said the Kirchners had succeeded in alienating
Washington to the point where Washington did not care what
Argentina (unlike Brazil or Chile) had to say about anything.
The Ambassador sought to disabuse Macri of that notion,
arguing that Washington remained fully committed to deepening
and strengthening relations with Argentina. She pointed out
that Washington was keenly aware of Argentina's position in
the world as an agricultural powerhouse and of Argentine
cooperation, actual and potential. As an example, she cited
Argentina's role in developing satellites to be launched by
NASA as evidence of Washington's appreciation for the
high-tech value that Argentina could bring to bear.
Macri's Running!
----------------
¶8. (C) In discussing agricultural trade, Macri let slip his
presidential ambitions for 2011. He said beef exports may
not be an issue for the Kirchners (because they want to keep
beef at home), but beef will be an issue for him in a couple
of years (i.e., when he is president).
New Embassy Building?
---------------------
¶9. (C) Macri also asked about USG plans to relocate the
Embassy and referred to a previous offer to provide a site
for a new office building. (The site is located in downtown
Buenos Aires, less than two miles from the Casa Rosada, in an
old industrial area that the city wishes to develop into an
upscale neighborhood that would include a number of Embassies
-- see 08 Buenos Aires 1564.) The Ambassador and DCM
explained (as we did in late 2008 after consulting with
Washington) that the Department was committed to finding a
site that would conform to new security requirements, but
that the size of the project and more pressing demands
elsewhere meant that it would be several more years before
the project could get underway in Buenos Aires.
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) The meeting was another reminder of Macri's
directness, his Manichean view of the world, and his
discomfort with the niceties of interpersonal communication
(he cut off the meeting abruptly after about twenty minutes).
These are all qualities that he shares with Nestor Kirchner,
his bitter political rival. Macri's insistence that the USG
publicly reproach the Kirchners for their various
transgressions suggests an unrealistic desire that Washington
do the opposition's bidding. Nonetheless, the mayor remains
one of the top contenders for the 2011 presidential race
(arguably the second most competitive candidate, after Vice
President Julio Cobos). We will continue to engage him
actively as the elections approach.
MARTINEZ
REFERENCIA ID 09BUENOSAIRES1235
ASUNTO C) ARGENTINA: CFK'S FIRST TWO CABINET CHIEFS SAY KIRCHNERS'
CREADO 2009-11-20
LANZADO 2010-12-01
CLASIFICACION CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
VZCZCXYZ0035
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #1235/01 3241653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 201653Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0071
INFO MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001235
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/11/20
TAGS: PGOV PINR AR
SUBJECT: (C) ARGENTINA: CFK'S FIRST TWO CABINET CHIEFS SAY KIRCHNERS'
SHELF-LIFE WILL EXPIRE IN 2011
REF: BUENOS AIRES 1026; BUENOS AIRES 301
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, DCM, DOS, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Over the past six weeks, we have held several
conversations with President Fernandez de Kirchner's first two
Cabinet Chiefs, Alberto Fernandez and Sergio Massa. Both believe
that the Kirchners, despite their recent political successes,
cannot win re-election in 2011. They disagree on whom is next in
line: Fernandez thinks that the next President will be Vice
President Julio Cobos, while Massa believes that Senator Carlos
Reutemann will prevail. Both ex-Cabinet chiefs are (separately)
plotting their futures in a post-Kirchner political landscape.
Massa expanded on earlier comments to us (ref a) on life with the
Kirchners, describing ex-president Nestor Kirchner as a "monster"
and a "psychopath." End Summary.
¶2. (C) We have had several conversations with the first two
Cabinet Chiefs of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK), Alberto
Fernandez and Sergio Massa. The Ambassador had an introductory
meeting with Alberto Fernandez, who served as Cabinet Chief in both
Nestor and CFK's administrations, on October 28, and DCM lunched
with Fernandez on October 2. The Ambassador and DCM also had
dinner with CFK's second cabinet chief Sergio Massa and his wife,
city councilor-elect Malena Galmarini, at the home of Massa's
former Casa Rosada aide, businessman Jorge O'Reilly, on November
¶12. In each of these conversations, the two prominent Peronists,
who during their tenures in the Casa Rosada worked every day with
the Kirchners to run the Argentine government, were quite frank in
expressing their estrangement from the Kirchners and their
pessimism about the first couple's political prospects.
Alberto and Massa Agree: Kirchners Will Lose in 2011
¶3. (C) Massa said that the Kirchners have no chance to capture the
presidency in 2011. When asked to estimate their chances, Massa
replied, "zero." He also discounted the view that the Kirchners
would extend their rule through Chavez-style governance. Massa
said that, for all of its problems, Argentina is not Venezuela.
Its society remained too literate, too middle class, and too
"temperate," and its economy is far more complex and diverse than
Venezuela's oil monoculture. Argentina, he said, would not abide
the Kirchner's attempts to consolidate power through more
autocratic rule. The result of their hardball tactics after the
midterm elections, he argued, was even more negative ratings in the
polls.
¶4. (C) Fernandez predicted that Nestor would be the Kirchners'
presidential candidate in 2011. He claimed that Nestor has a
better reputation for competence than CFK. Fernandez told the DCM
that his soundings on CFK's potential run for re-election
invariably provoked reactions of alarm and exasperation.
¶5. (C) But Nestor cannot possibly win, continued Fernandez,
comparing the former president to Carlos Menem circa 1999. He said
that, like Menem ten years ago, Kirchner could hope for no more
than 20 percent of the votes in the first round of the presidential
election. These voters, he continued, are Kirchner
"fundamentalists" whose votes reflect ideological affinity or
association with the various political machines (controlled by
piqueteros, labor leaders, etc.) that remain loyal to the Kirchner
project. Fernandez said that, because Kirchner at this point in
his political career has zero attraction to independent voters, he
could expect to win no more votes in the second round of elections
than he would in the first. Fernandez predicted that Nestor would
run and CFK would increasingly govern from the Left, as that "is
the only constituency that remains to them." He added, though,
that such a strategy was doomed to fail -- "the Left on its own
can't elect anyone to the Presidency in this country," he said.
Alberto and Massa Disagree on Next President
¶6. (C) Massa identified Santa Fe Senator Carlos Reutemann as the
likely presidential winner in 2011. He said that Reutemann's
strategy of lying low was prudent, not a blunder or sign of
indecision as often portrayed in the press. With Reutemann quiet,
the Kirchner machine was focused on pummeling Vice President Cobos
and Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri. The onslaught, he argued,
would damage both of those potential opponents to a Reutemann
candidacy. When the race really begins, Reutemann would be
well-placed to obtain the Peronist nomination and steamroll the
rest of the field. Massa said that the Peronist race would not
begin in earnest until May 1, 2010, when he said five large
Peronist rallies would mark May Day for the first time in years.
¶7. (C) Alberto Fernandez identified Vice President Cobos as the
next president of Argentina. Fernandez noted that Cobos continues
to be the most popular politician in the country, and is conserving
his advantage intelligently. He expected that Coalicion Civica
leader Elisa Carrio, the runner-up in the 2007 election and a
bitter rival of Cobos, would run in the first round and win a
maximum of 12 percent of the vote, deflating the Vice President's
first-round numbers, but Cobos would come out on top. "It's his
election to lose," concluded Fernandez. He took issue with Massa's
view that Peronists would prevail once they united behind a
candidate. Fernandez, a long-time Peronist activist who headed the
party apparatus in Buenos Aires city for many years, said that his
party only controls the loyalty of 38 percent of the electorate.
Given the Kirchners' continuing control over the party apparatus,
the Peronist candidate, even if it ends up being someone with a
last name that is not Kirchner, would not appeal to non-Peronist
voters in 2011. The party's presidential prospects in the coming
election were therefore, in Fernandez's view, poor.
Massa: Nestor is a Monster and Psychopath
¶8. (C) Massa was scathing in his criticism of the first couple,
especially Nestor. Though he made light of press reports that he
and Kirchner came to blows at the campaign bunker in the pre-dawn
hours after their mid-term defeat last June, he called Nestor "a
psychopath," "a monster," and "a coward" whose bullying approach to
politics masks a deep sense of insecurity and inferiority.
(Massa's wife registered such alarm at these uninhibited comments
that he asked her to "stop making faces at me."
He disputed the
argument that Nestor deserved credit as a savvy tactician,
describing the ex-president as blunder-prone and so convinced of
his own brilliance that he was certain to keep making mistakes.
(We've heard similar comments from Fernandez on Nestor's faltering
political judgment -- ref b.) He said that Nestor could not
relate to others outside the narrow gauge of his own political
ambitions: "Kirchner's not a perverse genius," Massa concluded.
"He is just perverse."
¶9. (C) Massa described his twelve-month term as Cabinet Chief as
an ordeal, as he struggled to deal with a controlling presidential
spouse and a "submissive, withdrawn" President "who would be much
better without Nestor than she is with him." He said that, during
his tenure at the Casa Rosada, he decided to do the Oprah-like
daytime TV show hosted by grand dame Mirtha Legrand. On the set
minutes before the show's taping began, he received a call from
Nestor instructing him to walk off the set because the apolitical
Legrand "was an opposition figure." Massa told him he would do the
show unless his official boss CFK, who was travelling abroad,
instructed him otherwise. He then received three successive calls
from Cabinet members pleading with him not to do the show. Massa
did not follow their advice.
Both Focusing on Post-Kirchner Future
¶10. (C) As for his own plans, Massa confirmed that he plans to run
in 2011 for governor of Buenos Aires province, which could pit him
against midterm winner Francisco de Narvaez, incumbent Daniel
Scioli and labor strongman Hugo Moyano. Massa said that he will
announce his candidacy on the third week of January, the week when
(largely vacationing) Argentines buy the most newspapers.
Fernandez also commented on the Buenos Aires race, opining that
Scioli's political moment had passed. Calling the governor "a nice
guy," he observed that Nestor had used him (by grabbing him as his
slate-mate in the province during the midterms) and then cast him
aside. "Scioli is trapped, and he knows it," Fernandez said.
¶11. (C) Fernandez remains politically active as well. He told
the DCM that he is talking to many political figures within and
outside Peronism, including Cobos and the fellow would-be Peronist
kingmaker, ex-President Eduardo Duhalde. Within the party, he
expressed particular interest in the 40-year-old governor of Salta
province Juan Manuel Urtubey. He said that, despite his belief
that Cobos is likely to win the presidency, he is counseling
Urtubey to throw his hat in the ring. He says that the campaign
strategy would be to nudge Nestor out in the first round for second
place, and then emerge as the Peronist candidate in the run-off
against Cobos. (Comment: It appears that Urtubey, once regarded
as a reliable Kirchner ally, is listening. He agreed to host
Fernandez in a much-photographed visit to Salta on November 14,
fueling speculation that the two were plotting a presidential run.)
Comment: Common Views, Divergent Paths
¶12. (C) Massa and Fernandez have much in common, from their
unique experience in CFK's cabinet to their active roles in the
burgeoning anti-Kirchner movement within Peronism. They are both
generally pro-American in orientation. They do not, however, work
together very closely, and their futures seem quite different.
Fernandez, 50, is low-key and content to operate in the background
while others take the spotlight. The most that he seems to aspire
to is success in behind-the-scenes political kingmaking, which
could restore him to his former status as the country's most
influential political consigliore. Massa, 37, the younger man by
more than a decade, has more ambitious plans. He hopes to win the
Buenos Aires governorship and, eventually, the Argentine
presidency.
MARTINEZ