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Este es uno de mis primeros posts,espero que les guste . Luego de toda la polemica internacionl en lo referente al escándalo de "Wikileaks", muchos de sus servidores fueron descolgados de la red, pero hay muchos otros que no y aqui los dejo: http://213.251.145.96/ http://wikileaks.ch/ EDITO:encontre otros servidores http://wikileaks.nl/ http://wikileaks.org.mx/ ----------------------- (es el mismo server que postie primero) http://wikileaks.fi/ http://wikileaks.de/------------------------------ ( es el mismo server que el segundo que postie ".ch" fuente: http://www.taringa.net/posts/info/8223279/Ya-cerraron-un-Domio-de-Wikileaks.html Edito: otro mas http://46.59.1.2/ ---- (fuente: http://www.taringa.net/posts/noticias/8260748/Wikileaks_-nuevo-codigo-de-ingreso_.html Por el mometo estos son los servidores que pude hallar, si llego a encontrar mas edito el post. Por otro lado aca les dejo el link con los cables diplomaticos publicados respecto a Argentina. http://wikileaks.ch/tag/AR_0.html Ah y para quienes no manejen muy bien el ingles les dejo el link al traductor de google http://translate.google.com.ar/translate_t?q=wikileaks&hl=es&biw=1360&bih=575&prmd=nl&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wT#en|es| Ademas les dejo una nota muy interesante: Wikileaks humilla al Cibercomando (+ Infografía) 30 Noviembre 2010 96 Comentarios "Whistleblower?" Julian Assange: 9/11 was NOT a ConspiracyEl gobierno de EEUU, siempre tan coherente, ataca al mensajero para que todo el mundo se olvide del mensaje. Resulta que el enemigo es Wikileaks, particularmente Julian Assange -su figura más visible-, pero ni una disculpa por los “excesos” de la diplomacia norteamericana, ni por la práctica de la tortura en los territorios ocupados, ni por los pagos a los contratistas privados que disparan a la multitud cuando están de mal humor, ni por las mentiras que han divulgado para justificar las guerras que desangran a Iraq, Afganistán y Yemen -país que, ahora sabemos, también forma parte del teatro de operaciones de los EEUU. Wikileaks comenzó el domingo la filtración de más de 250 000 informes de las oficinas diplomáticas de Estados Unidos en el mundo, asociado con cinco grandes periódicos: New York Times, The Guardian, El País, Le Monde y Der Spigel. El golpe es demoledor para la política imperial norteamericana, que había aprendido a convivir con los medios tradicionales, domesticándolos. Ahora estos saben que tienen que adaptarse a la nueva era, la del ciberespacio, con sus millones de fuentes autónomas de información, que han resultado ser una amenaza decisiva a la capacidad de silenciar en la que se ha fundado siempre la dominación. Lo que estamos presenciando es histórico y humillante para los halcones imperiales. Con su audaz estrategia de coordinación entre los medios tradicionales y los llamados medios sociales, Wikileaks ha ganado la primera gran batalla de la “Era de Información” contra los mecanismos que en las últimas décadas han utilizado los Estados Unidos y sus aliados gubernamentales y mediáticos para influir, controlar y coaccionar a todo el planeta. Una de las consecuencias en las que más se han detenido los analistas es en la torcedura de brazo a los medios transnacionales, que pactaron con Wikileaks tras el cálculo de que si la colaboración con los EEUU termina por ver la luz pública gracias al activismo individual y a la Internet, los estados clientes y sus dirigentes van a estar menos dispuestos a acompañar las maquinaciones imperiales. Por una vez, el Imperio ha recibido un durísimo y humillante golpe, que lo ha puesto contra las cuerdas con signos visibles de impotencia y descoordinación. La prueba es el intento frenético del Departamento de Estado de alertar de las filtraciones a sus funcionarios y a sus aliados durante el fin de semana. En medio del corre corre, un congresista pidió a la Secretaria Clinton incluir a Wikileaks en la lista de las organizaciones terroristas extranjeras. Luego vino el ataque de denegación de servicio contra el sitio web, una hora antes del lanzamiento programado este domingo, que algunos analistas atribuyeron a una torpe intervención del nuevo Comando Ciberespacial de los EEUU. El Comando llegó a su “completa capacidad operativa” hace menos de un mes y ya está peleándose con la CIA y con el Departamento de Seguridad Interior para ver quién tiene autoridad en las acciones ofensivas y el control de las redes de telecomunicaciones en el ámbito civil. Amy Davidson, editora de la prestigiosa revista The New Yorker, alertaba hace unos días por dónde iban a venir los tiros del gobierno de Obama contra Wikileaks: 1. Acusar a Assange y a sus colegas de espionaje, independientemente de que ellos estén fuera de la jurisdicción norteamericana; pedirle a los aliados de EEUU que hagan lo mismo; 2. Explorar las oportunidades para que el Presidente Obama incluya a los colaboradores de Wikileaks en la lista de combatientes enemigos, allanando el camino para acciones no judiciales en su contra. 3. Congelar los activos de la organización Wikileaks y de sus partidarios, y aplicar sanciones financieras a aquellas instituciones que colaboren con esta organización; impedirles todo tipo de transacciones en dólares norteamericanos; 4. Darle la oportunidad al nuevo Cibercomando de EE.UU. de demostrar que pueden, por vía electrónica, asaltar a WikiLeaks y a cualquier compañía de telecomunicaciones que ofrezca sus servicios a esta organización; 5. La celebración de audiencias en el Congreso para evaluar cómo la información clasificada podría estar comprometida y cómo EEUU puede identificar mejor y luchar contra organizaciones políticas como Wikileaks. Hillary Clinton insinuó algunas de estas medidas en su conferencia de prensa del lunes y, conteniendo a duras penas la ira, aseguró que su Gobierno dará “pasos agresivos contra los responsables de la filtración”. El fiscal general de Estados Unidos, Eric Holder, anunció inmediatamente después que su departamento abrió una investigación criminal para “depurar responsabilidades” por la divulgación de estos documentos “pone en riesgo la seguridad nacional”. Sarah Palin, figura emblemática de la ultraderecha norteamericana, se preguntaba en Facebook, por qué el gobierno “no había utilizado todos los medios cibernéticos a nuestra disposición para desmantelar de manera permanente a Wikileaks”. Unos y otros han intentado centrar la atención en Julián Assange, el fundador de Wikileaks -¿en qué guerra de EEUU no hay un villano?-. Sin embargo, eso no explica la escasa compostura de los líderes norteamericanos, tanto de Hillary como de los jerarcas del Pentágono que han tenido que darle la cara a las varias oleadas de filtraciones. Las estructuras de poder norteamericano, estén o no en el gobierno, se dan perfecta cuenta de que esto va mucho más allá de la revelación de pruebas de lo que ya más o menos cualquiera sabe: los abusos de toda índole de Washington. Lo que ha desatado las alarmas en Washington es que Wikileaks demuestra que un pequeño grupo de periodistas e informáticos, utilizando hábilmente las nuevas tecnologías y maniobrando en las redes sociales y en las aguas turbias de la comunicación transnacional, puede poner en jaque a la mayor superpotencia del mundo y a su super-ejército ciberespacial, con 1 000 hackers, un presupuesto multimillonario y una abrumadora campaña de terror para imponer en todo el mundo, con el pretexto de la ciberseguridad, la ciberguerra. “Es precisamente ese creciente prestigio de profesionalidad de Wikileaks el que preocupa en las alturas”, diría el sociólogo Manuel Castells, el académico que mejor ha descrito los espectaculares cambios que se estan produciendo a escala planetaria desde la aparición de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Telecomunicaciones (TICs). Julián Assange y sus compañeros, más los miles de usuarios de la Internet que colaboran de una manera o de otra con este proyecto, son hijos de esta nueva realidad histórica. Nadie puede predecir hasta dónde más podrá llegar Wikileaks en esta batalla contra Estados Unidos. El poder tiene una enorme capacidad para controlar los daños, desaparecer o reciclar a sus oponentes y tender un manto de olvido. Pero ahora mismo, en medio de los fogonazos, son perceptibles ciertas claves que no debería desdeñar ninguna estrategia de resistencia: el conocimiento y apropiación de las nuevas tecnologías, el valor de la transparencia informativa, el ciberespacio como ámbito de acciones tanto ofensivas como defensivas, y las extraordinarias posibilidades de Internet como herramienta de lucha. Fuente de na nota: http://www.cubadebate.cu/opinion/2010/11/30/wikileaks-humilla-al-cibercomando/ Edito Aca abajo les dejo uno de los cables referentes a las politicas "K" de nuestro gobierno: VZCZCXRO4935 PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHBU #1462/01 1801546 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 291546Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5073 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES 001462 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO NSC FOR DAN FISK TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE USCINCSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: THE K-STYLE OF POLITICS REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 01090 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 01403 ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 02974 ¶D. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141 ¶E. 05 BUENOS AIRES 02835 ¶F. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00115 Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ------------------------ SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION ------------------------ ¶1. (C) This cable is designed to examine President Nestor Kirchner's unique operating and decision-making style that has become known as the "K-Style." Given Kirchner's control over all aspects of GOA policymaking, knowledge of Kirchner's motivations and methods in arriving at decisions is essential to understanding GOA actions. ¶2. (C) President Nestor Kirchner's personalistic, often erratic operating and decision-making style defines current Argentine policymaking and is characterized by an overarching focus on the short-term and politically expedient accumulation and maintenance of domestic political power. Kirchner's domestic political style leaves no room for dissent and utilizes divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken the political opposition. While utilizing leftist, populist rhetoric at times, in practice Kirchner has demonstrated that his ideological leanings are always less important than the practicalities of domestic politics. Studies show that Kirchner's psychological profile includes a need to always be in control, quick and decisive decision making, a constant struggle against perceived enemies, and a tendency to respond to challenges by lashing out, rather than negotiation. Foreign policy in the Kirchner government is always subservient to domestic political considerations. President Kirchner is not skilled at international diplomacy and often ignores basic protocol. Kirchner relies on an ever-shrinking group of long-time advisors to make key decisions, many of whom lack international, business and economic expertise. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. -------------------------------- THE K-STYLE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS -------------------------------- ¶3. (C) President Nestor Kirchner's personalistic, often erratic operating and decision-making style defines current Argentine policymaking and is characterized by an overarching focus on the short-term and politically expedient accumulation and maintenance of domestic political power. Close Kirchner insiders have described Kirchner's decision-making process to Emboffs as one in which Kirchner consults with a small number of trusted advisors, generally one-on-one, and then makes all of the final decisions himself. The Argentine political system places a great deal of authority into the hands of the President, and President Kirchner is a strong president even in the Argentine historical context. As a result, the "K-Style" defines the GOA policymaking process and gives the policy process a short-term focus. As Legal and Technical Secretary Carlos Zannini, a close Kirchner advisor, told the DCM, "The President and I get up every morning, look at the morning papers, and try to figure out how to survive the day." Another long-time Kirchner associate, former Santa Cruz Governor Sergio Acevedo told us that Kirchner focuses very much on day-to-day issues, but always with the long-term strategic goal of retaining political power. (COMMENT: Kirchner's focus on retaining political power leads us to discount speculation that Kirchner will step aside in 2007 and make his wife Cristina the presidential candidate. For 2011, assuming Kirchner's health holds, we would expect him to either modify the Constitution to allow him to run for a third term, or to pass the mantel on to his wife. END COMMENT.) ¶4. (C) Kirchner's domestic political style leaves no room for dissent and utilizes divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken BUENOS AIR 00001462 002 OF 005 the political opposition. Kirchner is quick to silence any opposition to his policies from within his movement, as when he recently expelled congresswoman Maria del Carmen Alarcon from the presidency of the Lower House Agricultural Committee and from Kirchner's Victory Front (FPV) after Alarcon criticized the GOA beef policy (See Reftel A). Kirchner has also proven adept at co-opting members of the opposition and exploiting divisions within opposition parties. Through the skillful use of his fiscal powers, Kirchner has been able to draw in the majority of the Radical Civic Union (UCR) governors, and many UCR mayors (See Septel on deteriorating provincial finances and Kirchner's use of fiscal power for political aims). He has also been able to co-opt the political leadership from the now defunct center-left Frepaso and most of the Peronists formerly aligned in opposition to Kirchner with former President Eduardo Duhalde. Kirchner has exploited divisions within the UCR by heavily courting Mendoza Governor Julio Cobos, long-time rival of UCR President Roberto Iglesias, even encouraging rumors that Cobos may be Kirchner's running mate in 2007. Kirchner also does not accept criticism from those outside of the political arena, attacking the press, the Catholic Church and business leaders that have been publicly critical of the GOA. ¶5. (C) While utilizing leftist, populist rhetoric at times, in practice Kirchner has demonstrated that his ideological leanings are always less important than the practicalities of domestic politics. As Acevedo recently told us, President Kirchner has no true ideology. For example, the issue of human rights and his political affiliations in the 1970s were non-issues in the 20 years of Kirchner's political life as Mayor of Rio Gallegos and Governor of Santa Cruz province. Acevedo said Kirchner's recent support for the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and a renewed focus on human rights crimes committed under the last dictatorship was driven by his need to develop a core base of support within the left wing of the Peronist movement. Kirchner was also a big proponent of the 1990s privatizations at the time they occurred, but has since vehemently attacked them. This does not mean that Kirchner does not have left-wing sympathies, but rather that these are completely subordinate to his personal political interests and ambition (See Reftel B). Kirchner's left-wing sympathies have not stopped him from forming alliances of convenience with center-right Peronist leaders, such as Luis Barrionuevo of Catamarca, Cordoba Governor Jose Manuel de la Sota, or the largely conservative Peronist political machine in Buenos Aires province. ¶6. (C) Kirchner's style of policymaking has become more pronounced after the October 2005 elections and November 2005 cabinet changes left Kirchner firmly in charge of all aspects of GOA decision making (See Reftel C). Prior to the October elections, Kirchner had to consider former President Duhalde's opinion in making major decisions. Kirchner's resounding victory in Buenos Aires province in the elections left him in control of the Peronist Party (PJ) and banished Duhalde from the center stage of the political scene. Before Kirchner's November cabinet changes, Kirchner also had to contend with his independent-minded Minister of the Economy, Roberto Lavagna, in making economic policy decisions, and with then-Foreign Minister Rafael Bielsa, who occasionally exhibited an independent streak. Their replacements, Felisa Miceli and Jorge Taiana are loyal soldiers who follow presidential orders. For example, recently Miceli was give a copy of a communique that had been issued to a news agency by the Casa Rosada with Miceli's comments criticizing a recent speech by Lavagna before Miceli had actually spoken. As leading pollster Roberto Bacman told Poloff, "Never since the return to democracy (1983) has Argentina had a President that was also the Minister of the Economy." --------------------------------------------- KIRCHNER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE SETS K-STYLE --------------------------------------------- ¶7. (C) According to recent studies, Kirchner's psychological profile includes a need to always be in control, quick and decisive decision making, and a constant struggle against perceived enemies. Kirchner does not delegate policymaking, BUENOS AIR 00001462 003 OF 005 making all of the important decisions himself. Kirchner only consults with a narrow group of long-time advisors, who are part of Kirchner's inner circle primarily because of their loyalty, not their technical abilities (See Reftel D). He often does not even consult or give warning to top GOA officials before making major policy statements in their respective areas of responsibility. According to Central Bank officials, for example, Central Bank President Martin Redrado found out that the GOA was going to use nearly 10 USD billion in Central Bank reserves to pay off the IMF when Kirchner publicly announced it. Casa Rosada insiders have described Kirchner as prone to making quick, sometimes even rash decisions. For example, Kirchner reportedly made a snap decision to institute a six-month ban on beef exports after learning that the price of beef had risen a significant amount the previous day in the country's most important beef market. Kirchner has lashed out at has perceived enemies, both domestic and foreign, throughout his presidency. Kirchner's targets have included the IMF, the U.S., the media, the Catholic Church, the Argentine military, the foreign and domestic business community, supermarkets, foreign gas stations, anything that happened in the 1990s, former Presidents Carlos Menem, Fernando de la Rua and Eduardo Duhalde. Kirchner often targets unpopular groups or individuals as a means to increase his own public approval ratings. ¶8. (C) When confronted with a problem, Kirchner's first instinct is to go on the offensive, rather than negotiate, upping the ante if his initial efforts fail to win the desired result. When Kirchner faced resistance from the business and agricultural sector on his efforts to control inflation earlier in the year, Kirchner instituted a ban on the export of beef and appointed the unorthodox Peronist economist Guillermo Moreno to run the GOA's anti-inflation efforts through bullying and threatening individual producers to lower their prices. When Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez did not respond well to Kirchner's insistence that Uruguay halt the construction of two paper plants on the Argentine border to conduct additional environmental studies, Kirchner's rhetoric encouraged the residents of the affected province to step up their blockade of the bridges connecting the two countries, resulting in millions of dollars of lost trade and tourism income for Uruguay. Faced with rising gas prices in early 2005, Kirchner called for a national boycott of Shell Oil and sent thousands of piqueteros to blockade Shell Oil gas stations until they agreed to lower their prices. ¶9. (C) Kirchner has a reputation for taking slights or any perceived lack of respect from others personally, but is also known for quick changes in temperament. Acevedo told the DCM that once then-Governor Kirchner became enraged with his Deputy Energy Minister for making a statement regarding Santa Cruz energy policy he did not personally approve. Kirchner called the Deputy Minister into his office and proceeded to scream at him at the top of his lungs, ultimately effectively throwing him out of his office physically. Everyone in the provincial government leadership expected the Deputy Minister to be fired. Kirchner did not speak to him for two weeks, until he unexpectedly called him asking for some trout for a dinner that Kirchner was hosting. Acevedo said this individual had a reputation for knowing where to get the best trout in Rio Gallegos. The Deputy Minister complied with the request, and two days later Kirchner invited him for coffee. Kirchner greeted him warmly, thanked him for the trout, and proceeded to chat with him for a long period, as if the previous incident had never happened, to the shock of everyone else present, including the Deputy Minister. In the end, the Deputy Minister was not fired, and Kirchner did not raise the issue again. ¶10. (C) Kirchner's health condition exacerbates, and perhaps helps define, Kirchner's emotions and psychology. President Kirchner has reportedly suffered from irritable bowel syndrome for many years. According to the American Medical Association, the psychological effects of this condition leads those who suffer from it to be "often rigid, methodical persons who are conscientious, with obsessive-compulsive BUENOS AIR 00001462 004 OF 005 tendencies." Kirchner also reportedly works himself to exhaustion and needs to take frequent vacations to recover. The AMA further states "Psychologic and social stresses are often present in patients with irritable bowel syndrome, and may be related in a temporal sense to the exacerbation of symptoms." This may account for Kirchner's lack of attention to protocol that involves long ceremonies or tight schedules, where Kirchner would not have quick access to a bathroom. ----------------------------------- FOREIGN POLICY NOT KIRCHNER'S FOCUS ----------------------------------- ¶11. (C) Foreign policy in the Kirchner government is always subservient to domestic political considerations. Kirchner, at least initially, took a hard line on the paper mills dispute with Uruguay -- despite the damage to Mercosur and regional relations -- because of the strong Argentine public concern about the paper mills, particularly in ruling-party-run Entre Rios province that is on the opposite side of the river from the plants. Kirchner's explicit and harsh criticism of the U.S. during his speech during the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata can only be understood in the context of dismal public perceptions of the U.S. and Kirchner's desire to appeal to his leftist political base (See Reftel E). Kirchner's hardball tactics during negotiations over Argentina's private sector debt and his criticism of foreign companies that run major enterprises that were privatized in the 1990s do not earn him any support from foreign investors, but are popular with the Argentine public. Likewise, Kirchner cut Argentine gas exports to Chile in 2005 to cover shortages in the internal market despite the existence of valid contracts between Chile and local gas suppliers. ¶12. (C) President Kirchner is not skilled at international diplomacy and often ignores basic protocol. Kirchner's gaffes with foreign dignitaries are legendary. In June 2004, Kirchner left Russian leader Vladimir Putin waiting at the Moscow airport for a meeting that never happened, reportedly because Cristina Kirchner wanted to spend more time shopping at their previous stop in Prague. The GOA claimed that "bad weather" had delayed their takeoff when weather reports showed sunny conditions in Prague. Later that year, President Kirchner failed to attend a state dinner he was supposed to host for visiting Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong. In like fashion, Kirchner failed to attend a reception in honor of the State visit of Queen Beatriz of Holland in March of 2006. Kirchner also never receives new Ambassadors, as state protocol would dictate, relegating this responsibility to Vice President Daniel Scioli. ¶13. (C) Kirchner relies on an ever-shrinking group of long-time advisors to make key decisions, many of whom lack international, business and economic expertise (See Reftel D). No one from the Foreign Ministry is part of Kirchner's inner circle of advisors, and very few of Kirchner's close associates had overseas experience before Kirchner became President (See Reftel F). As a result, Kirchner often receives poor advice on international issues, such as when Legal and Technical Secretary Carlos Zannini reportedly convinced Kirchner that taking a tough line publicly on counter terrorism would, in the eyes of the USG, compensate for being critical of the U.S. in other areas and opposing the FTAA at the Summit of the Americas (See Reftel E). ------------------------------------ COMMENT -- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ------------------------------------ ¶14. (C) Kirchner's peculiar operating and decision-making style defines Argentine policymaking, and in the coming year, may lead to more challenges in the U.S.-Argentine relationship, as Kirchner focuses on shoring up his center-left political base for the 2007 elections. Given poll numbers that show Argentines have the least positive view of the U.S. out of all nations in the region, the U.S. will be a convenient target for Kirchner. As during the 2003 presidential campaign, Kirchner will likely portray himself BUENOS AIR 00001462 005 OF 005 as the lone true defender of Argentina in the world community. The Casa Rosada has reportedly already begun an effort to link Roberto Lavagna to the U.S., for example by encouraging press articles that the U.S. approved and is sponsoring a potential Lavagna campaign for President. ¶15. (C) Kirchner has a history of using international disputes, like the paper mill conflict with Uruguay, to gain domestic popular support. We have been told by our British colleagues that relations between the U.K. and Argentina are at their lowest point in 15 years because Kirchner has chosen a confrontational attitude with the U.K. on the Falkland Islands dispute, thereby making political use of an issue that is at the core of Argentine national identity. As leading political analyst Rosendo Fraga told Poloff, "This year, Kirchner will use the U.K. and Uruguay as targets, and next year, it will be the U.S." Kirchner has been described to us by his close associates as someone who constantly focuses on the costs and benefits of his political decisions. During a recent trip to Spain, Kirchner criticized the U.S.'s "absence" and lack of significant assistance to the region. Former Minister Lavagna told the Ambassador that Kirchner did this in order to counter the image that he had been too forthcoming with Spanish multinationals during the trip. As the 2007 presidential campaign approaches, we cannot rule out occasional anti-U.S. diatribes by Kirchner in order to placate his leftist supporters. GUTIERREZ